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LYNCH V. BOARD OF EDUCATIONTEACHER'S APPARENT AUTHORITY RENDERS
SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE
Prior to 1959, Illinois school districts were considered quasi-municipal corporations and, therefore, absolved from tort liability under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.' In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No.
302,' however, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that public policy
militated against allowing school districts or their agents to engage in tortious conduct with impunity when private persons would be responsible for
the same conduct. Accordingly, the court abolished the sovereign immunity
3
of school districts.
The General Assembly, reacting to Molitor,' amended the Illinois School
Code to restore limited immunity for school' districts and teachers in the
exercise of disciplinary or supervisory activities. 5 In Kobylanski v. Chicago
Board of Education,6 the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted that statute to
apply to "all matters relating to the . . . conduct of the schools."'

The

effect of this interpretation was to confer blanket immunity from negligence
and to impose liability on districts and teachers only for willful and wanton
misconduct.
Two years later the court qualified the expansive Kobylanski decision
when faced with a school district's alleged negligence in providing defective
athletic equipment to students. In Gerrity v. Beatty,' the court held that the
Kobylanski court's interpretation of sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School
Code was not intended to apply to furnishing equipment. Rather, a plaintiff
need only prove ordinary negligence to recover for negligent issuance of
defective athletic equipment." The court reasoned that public policy considerations required school districts to bear the obligation to issue safe athletic
equipment and that Kobylanski immunity was limited to "matters relating to

1. See Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Il. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898) (seminal decision
granting sovereign immunity to school districts). See generally Kerwin, Tort Liability for Illinois
Schools under Section 9-103 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 441 (1976).
2. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), modified on
other grounds, 24 I11. 2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962).
3. 18 I11.2d at 21, 163 N.E.2d at 96.
4. Compare Comment, Governmental Immunity in Illinois: The Molitor Decision and the
Legislative Reaction, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 588 (1959) (favorable review of Molitor) with Hickman,
Municipal Tort Liability in Illinois, 1961 U. ILL. L. F. 475 (criticizing Molitor as judicial legislation) and Huff, Tom Molitor and the Divine Right of Kings, 37 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 44 (1960)
(criticizing Molitor as judicial legislation).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84a (1979) (approved July 13, 1965).
6. 63 I11.2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
7. Id. at 173, 347 N.E.2d at 708 (emphasis in original).
8. 71 111. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (1978).
9. Id. at 52-53, 373 N.E.2d at 1326.
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the teacher's personal supervision and control of the conduct or physical
movement of the student."'O
After Kobylanski, Illinois courts were fairly in agreement as to the extent
of school district liability for injuries that occur during authorized school
activities. The more difficult question arises in determining what is actually
an authorized school activity, such that a duty of care is imposed upon the
district. Unless schools are informed of when an activity occurring on school
grounds will be deemed authorized, and thus trigger a school's liability for
negligence, prudence might dictate that a school chain its playgrounds or
provide constant supervision over its premises.
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue in Lynch v.
Board of Education." The Lynch court, applying the agency concept of
apparent authority, 2 found that an activity which a school refused to authorize, and from which it tried to disassociate itself, reasonably appeared to
third persons to be authorized because of the conduct of the teachers who
participated in the activity. Therefore, the district was held to have breached
its affirmative duty to provide adequate protective equipment.' 3 As the
court noted, the facts were close; therefore, an understanding of the facts is
essential.
Beginning in 1970, a girl's "powderpuff" football game was held at halftime of Collinsville high school's annual varsity homecoming game. In 1974,
however, the school cancelled the "powderpuff" game and attempted to disassociate itself from an ad hoc game that was being organized by a group of
students and teachers. The school refused to let announcements be made or
bulletins be posted concerning the game. Nevertheless, the girls practiced
on school grounds, used school locker rooms to change clothes, and eventually played the game on school property. Further, all these events were
directed by three teachers acting at the behest of the participating
students. 1,
During the game, Cynthia Lynch was struck in the face and knocked to
the ground by an opponent. 5 She brought suit for these game-related injuries against the school district and the trial court entered judgment on a
general verdict, finding the district negligent in failing to provide adequate

10. Id. at 51, 373 N.E.2d at 1325. See Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 Ill. 2d 165, 395
N.E.2d 538 (1979) (teacher liable for willful and wanton negligence in failing to inspect athletic
equipment).
11. 82 Ill. 2d 415, 412 N.E.2d 447 (1980).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 27 (1958); W. SEAvEY, HANDBOOK ON THE

§ 8 (1964).
13. 82 I11,
2d at 434-35, 412 N.E.2d at 459-60.
14. A more detailed discussion of the facts appears in the supreme court opinion. Id. at

LAW OF AGENCY

417-23, 412 N.E.2d at 451-54.

15. To add insult to injury, the plaintiff's team lost the game 52-0. Id. at 417, 412 N.E.2d at
451.
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protective equipment. " The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District
affirmed, holding that the game was an authorized school activity and that
sufficient evidence existed to justify the verdict. 7
In affirming the appellate court, however, the Illinois Supreme Court substituted a different rationale. The appellate court had imposed a duty to
provide adequate protective equipment by finding that the "powderpuff"
game was an authorized school activity.'" In contrast, the supreme court
refused to find that the game was expressly authorized and concluded that
such a determination was immaterial because the actions of the teachers
vested the game with the appearance of an authorized activity."
The supreme court's reliance on apparent authority to establish the school
district's duty to provide adequate equipment was erroneous in several respects. Initially, even if Justice Ryan was correct in criticizing the plurality
opinion for extending apparent authority to hold a principal liable in a
negligence action, 2 the facts did not indicate the existence of apparent
authority. Inherent in the concept of apparent authority is a requirement
that the authority of the agent emanate from the actions of the principal;
that is, authority may not be presumed from the acts or statements of the
putative agent. 2' Rather, apparent authority must be based on words or
acts of the principal that would lead a reasonably prudent person, exercising
diligence and discretion, to naturally believe that the agent possessed author22
ity to affect the legal relations of the principal.
Illinois courts have construed this requirement very narrowly. For example, mere possession of a principal's property with actual authority to execute a lease is insufficient to confer the appearance of authority to sell upon

16. Id. at 416-17, 412 N.E.2d at 450-51. The plaintiff also alleged willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant for failing to provide adequate supervision. The supreme
court, however, ruled that although the jury returned a general verdict, the presumption that
the jury found willful and wanton misconduct was sufficiently rebutted by the evidence. Id. at
430-32, 412 N.E.2d at 457-59.
17. Lynch v. Board of Educ., 72 Ill. App. 3d 317, 390 N.E.2d 526 (5th Dist. 1979).
18. Id. at 325, 390 N.E.2d at 532.
19. 82 Ill. 2d at 434, 412 N.E.2d at 459.
20. Id. at 439, 412 N.E.2d at 462 (Ryan, J., dissenting). See Smith v. Polukey, 22 I11.App.
2d 238, 252, 160 N.E.2d 508, 515 (2d Dist. 1959) (injured person does not rely on apparent
authority in getting hurt; actual authority must be proved to recover).
21. See Schoenberger v. Chicago Transit Auth., 84 Il. App. 3d 1132, 1136, 405 N.E.2d
1076, 1081 (1st Dist. 1980) (interviewer held to have no apparent authority to hire and set pay
scales); Chalet Ford, Inc. v. Red Top Parking, Inc., 62 I11.App. 3d 270, 274, 379 N.E.2d 88,
90-91 (1st Dist. 1978) (principal's actions over a four year period created apparent authority in
agent to accept car keys contrary to posted notice).
22. See Weisbrook v. Clyde C. Netzley, Inc., 58 I11. App. 3d 862, 865-66, 374 N.E.2d
1102, 1105-06 (2d Dist. 1978) (third party may not assume that agency relationship existed
between father and son merely because father loaned son money to purchase a car); Barraia v.
Donoghue, 49 I11.App. 3d 280, 282-83, 364 N.E.2d 952, 954 (lst Dist. 1977) (entrustment of
yacht and signed title are sufficient indicia to create agent's apparent authority to sell).
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an agent.' Unlike placing property in an agent's possession to lease to third
parties, the Lynch school district did not engage in any affirmative conduct
to confer upon its teachers apparent authority to coach the game, Quite the
contrary, the evidence indicated that the school district explicitly refused to
make announcements or post notices concerning the game. 4 In fact, the
school even countermanded an unauthorized announcement to clarify that
the game was not an authorized school activity.'
Further, to rely upon an agent's apparent authority a third party must
exercise due diligence and discretion to ascertain the agency's existence and
scope.' In Lynch, the supreme court assumed without discussion that the
plaintiff had exercised diligence and discretion in ascertaining the extent of
the teachers' authority; however, the standard to be applied is objective.
Therefore, the fact that the school made a countermanding announcement,
that it refused to allow the "powderpuff" game to be played at halftime of
the homecoming game, and that other students realized the game was not
authorized clearly indicates that a close factual question existed as to
plaintiff's duty to use due diligence and discretion. In such cases, it is imperative that the jury be accurately instructed. 7
Despite the obvious, difficult factual questions presented in Lynch, the
supreme court allowed the jury finding of an agency relationship based on
apparent authority to stand, even though the jury was not instructed on the
law regarding apparent authority.8 The Lynch court reasoned that because
the trial court sustained the defendant's objection to an instruction on apparent authority, the defendant could not argue on appeal that the failure to
give the instruction was erroneous.29 Granting that this reasoning is in
accord with Illinois precedent, the more reasonable disposition would have
been to remand the cause so that a jury could decide the close factual questions after proper instructions.
Further indication that the court's reasoning was erroneous appears in the
discussion of the duty imposed by the apparent agency. The court reasoned
that the duty to furnish equipment was imposed because the school knew or
should have known through its apparent agents that injury was foreseeable.'
23. See, e.g., Lawcock v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 55 II1. App. 2d 211, 216-17, 204
N.E.2d 802, 804 (1st Dist. 1965) (possession of principal's horse with authority to execute a
lease was insufficient to create apparent authority to sell).
24. 82 Ill. 2d at 425-26, 412 N.E.2d at 455.
25. id.
26. See Schoenberger v. Chicago Transit Auth., 84 I11.App. 3d 1132, 1135-36, 405 N.E.2d
1076, 1080-81 (1st Dist. 1980); Wing v. Lederer, 77 I11.App. 2d 413, 417, 222 N.E.2d 535,
537-38 (2d Dist. 1966).
27. See Both v. Nelson, 31 Ill. 2d 511, 514-15, 202 N.E.2d 801, 804 (1964); Edwards v.
Hill-Thomas Lime & Cement Co., 378 Ill. 180, 187, 37 N.E.2d 801, 804 (1941); Grover v.
Commonwealth Plaza Condominium Ass'n, 76 I11. App. 3d 500, 508-11, 394 N.E.2d 1273,
1279-81 (1st Dist. 1979).
28. 82 Ill. 2d at 428, 412 N.E.2d at 456.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 434-35, 412 N.E.2d at 459.
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This reasoning demonstrates an obvious misunderstanding of apparent authority. Apparent authority is an estoppel principle that binds a principal
when his actions appear to vest authority in an agent.3' The essence of the
concept is that liability is imposed based on the principal's manifestations to
the third party who dealt with the putative agent.3" Therefore, there need
not be any actual relationship between the principal and the apparent agent
through which the foreseeability of injury could be brought to the principal's
attention.
This was the situation in Lynch. The teachers who were found to be
apparent agents were operating independently of their function as school
employees. They were coaching after school hours, were receiving no remuneration, and were aware that the activity was unauthorized.'
Based on
this attenuated relationship between the school and the teachers, it is difficult to understand how the school could have foreseen injury resulting from
an activity with which it had no connection.
Finally, and most importantly, the agency discussion as it relates to this
case was wholly irrelevant. Because of an agency relationship, liability is
imposed on a principal for the wrongful actions of an agent acting within the
scope of his or her authority.'
As Justice Ryan explained in his dissenting
opinion, the cause of action in Lynch was not predicated upon any alleged
negligence by the teachers.3 The basis for the alleged negligence was the
school's failure to provide adequate protective equipment to the students.
Therefore, agency principles were entirely inapplicable to impose liability as
a principal on the school district in this case.
Nevertheless, this application of apparent authority was used to impose an
affirmative duty on the school district to provide equipment. The court's
reasoning seems to have been that because it appeared the teachers were
authorized to coach the game, the school district was estopped from denying
liability. As dissenting Justices Ryan and Goldenhersh asserted, such reasoning was circuitous and unnecessary. The evidence adduced was sufficient to
support the findings of the trial and appellate courts that the "powderpuff"
36
football game was an authorized activity.
The plurality opinion evinces a strained attempt to reach a desired result.
Utilizing the estoppel principle of apparent authority renders it virtually im31. See Bank of North Carolina v. Rock Island Bank, 630 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1980) (corporation's president is vested with apparent authority to conduct usual and ordinary functions of his
position); Crawford Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dvorak, 40 Ill. App. 3d 288, 293, 352 N.E.2d 261,
264-65 (1st Dist. 1976) (unlimited access to telephone creates apparent authority to conduct
ordinary and usual business for the principal).
32. See, e.g., Simpson v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 42 Ill. 2d 496, 499-500, 248
N.E.2d 117, 120 (1969) (travel agent who planned trip, including a flight on the defendant
airline, was not apparent agent of airline since the airline took no action conferring apparent
authority on the travel agent).
33. 82 Il1. 2d at 426, 412 N.E.2d at 455.
34. See W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 55, 83 (1964).
35. Id. at 438, 412 N.E.2d at 461 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
36. 82 Ill. 2d at 437, 412 N.E.2d at 461 (Goldenhersh, C.J., concurring).
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possible for school districts to limit liability by disassociating themselves
from unauthorized activities that are tangentially related to their schools. As
was the case in Lynch, the supreme court found that it reasonably appeared
to third parties that the "powderpuff" game was authorized, despite the
school's affirmative conduct to disassociate itself from the activity. Further,
because the court stated that the duty of the school district was "to furnish
equipment to prevent serious injuries . . . when an injury was foreseeable," 37
school districts must now take drastic action to protect themselves from
liability. For example, school districts might be well advised to limit access
to recreational areas to times when constant supervision is available. School
districts might consider prohibiting teachers from participating in any unauthorized extracurricular activities." Although the public policy against such
restrictive measures is obvious, 9 such actions might be the only available
alternatives to limit the potential liability created by the Lynch decision.

37. Id. at 434-35, 412 N.E.2d at 459.
38. In his concurring opinion, Justice Moran argued that the school district should have
taken more positive action to absolve itself from liability. Id. at 437-38, 412 N.E.2d at 461
(Moran, J., concurring).
39. In his dissent, Justice Ryan discussed the problems that a school district would face if it
were to impose burdensome restrictions on the use of its premises as a result of Lynch. Id. at
422-43, 412 N.E.2d at 463 (Ryan, J., dissenting).

